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Abstract
The aim of this article is to represent the general description of an
entity by means of its states, contexts and properties. The entity that
we want to describe does not necessarily have to be a physical entity,
but can also be an entity of a more abstract nature, for example a con-
cept, or a cultural artifact, or the mind of a person, etc..., which means
that we aim at very general description. The e®ect that a context has
on the state of the entity plays a fundamental role, which means that
our approach is intrinsically contextual. The approach is inspired by
the mathematical formalisms that have been developed in axiomatic
quantum mechanics, where a speci¯c type of quantum contextuality is
modelled. However, because in general states also in°uence context {
which is not the case in quantum mechanics { we need a more general
setting than the one used there. Our focus on context as a fundamen-
tal concept makes it possible to unify `dynamical change' and `change
under in°uence of measurement', which makes our approach also more
general and more powerful than the traditional quantum axiomatic
approaches. For this reason an experiment (or measurement) is intro-
duced as a speci¯c kind of context. Mathematically we introduce a
state context property system as the structure to describe an entity
by means of its states, contexts and properties. We also strive from
the start to a categorical setting and derive the morphisms between
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formalism", in Probing the Structure of Quantum Mechanics: Nonlinearity, Nonlocality,
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state context property systems from a merological covariance principle.
We introduce the category SCOP with as elements the state context
property systems and as morphisms the ones that we derived from this
merological covariance principle. We introduce property completeness
and state completeness and study the operational foundation of the
formalism.
1 Introduction
We put forward a formalism that aims at a general description of an entity
under in°uence of a context. The approach followed in this article is a contin-
uation of what has been started in [1, 2]. Meanwhile some new elements have
come up, and as a consequence what we present here deviates in some ways
from what was elaborated in [1, 2]. In [1] the formalism is founded on the
basic concepts of states, experiments and outcomes of experiments. One of
the aims in [1] is to generalize older approaches [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] by incorpo-
rating experiments with more than two outcomes from the start. The older
approaches are indeed founded on the basic concept of yes/no-experiment,
also called test, question or experimental project. An experiment with more
than two outcomes is described by the set of yes/no-experiments that can
be formed from this experiment by identifying outcomes in such a way that,
after identi¯cation, only two outcomes remain. The shift away from the old
approach with yes/no-experiments was inspired by the extra power, at ¯rst
sight at least, that formalisms that start from experiments with more than
two outcomes as basis posses [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Meanwhile, after [1, 2]
had been published, we have identi¯ed a fundamental problem that exists
in approaches that start with experiments with more than two outcomes.
1.1 The Subexperiment Problem in Quantum Mechanics
The problem that we have identi¯ed is the following. Suppose that in quan-
tum mechanics one considers a subexperiment of an experiment. Then it
is always the case that the subexperiment changes the state of the entity
under study in a di®erent way than the experiment does. If however a
subexperiment is de¯ned as the experiment where some of the outcomes
are identi¯ed, the subexperiment must change the state in the same way as
the original experiment. This means that in quantum mechanics subexper-
iments do not arise through an identi¯cation process on the outcomes of an
experiment. This also means that the general scheme inspired from proba-
bility theory, as for example in [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15], where outcomes are
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taken as basic concepts and events and experiments are de¯ned by means
of their identifying sets of outcomes, does not work for quantum mechanics.
The subexperiments that can be fabricated in these type of approaches are
not the subexperiments that one encounters in quantum mechanics.
When we were writing [1], we started to get aware of this fundamental
problem. We were very amazed that to the best of our knowledge nobody
else working in quantum axiomatics, ourselves included, seemed to have no-
ticed this before. It puts a fundamental limitation on the approaches where
one starts with experiments with more outcomes and deduces the subexper-
iments, for example the yes/no-experiments, by a procedure of identi¯cation
of outcomes, as in the approach presented in [1]. In [2] we have avoided the
problem by again working with yes/no-experiments as basic concepts. In this
article we will introduce experiments, and hence also yes/no-experiments,
in another way, not avoiding the problem, but tackling it head on. In [16]
we analyze in detail the subexperiment problem in quantum mechanics.
1.2 Applying the Formalism to Situations Outside the Mi-
croworld
The development of the formalism has always been grounded by applying
it to speci¯c examples of physical entities in speci¯c situations. Already
in the early years it became clear that the formalism, that originally was
developed with the aim of providing a realistic operational axiomatic foun-
dation for quantum mechanics, can be applied to describe entities that are
not part of the micro-physical region of reality. Since the formalism delivers
a general description of an entity, it is a priori not mysterious that it can
be applied to entities that are part of other regions of reality than the mi-
croworld. The study of such entities is interesting on its own and also can
shed light on the nature of quantum entities. In this sense we presented a
¯rst macroscopic mechanical entity entailing a quantum mechanical struc-
ture in [17, 18, 19]. More speci¯cally this entity represents a model for the
spin of a spin1
2 quantum entity.
The model puts forward an explanation of the quantum probabilities
as due to the presence of °uctuations on the interaction between the mea-
suring apparatus and the physical entity under consideration. We have
called this aspect of the formalism the `hidden measurement approach'
[21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]. The name refers to the fact that the
presence of these °uctuations can be interpreted as the presence of hid-
den variables in the measuring apparatus (hidden measurements) instead of
the presence of hidden variables in the state of the physical entity, which is
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what traditional hidden variable theories suppose. Concretely it means that,
when a measurement is performed, the actual measuring process that makes
occur one of the outcomes is deterministic once it starts. But each time a
measurement is repeated, which is necessary to obtain the probability as
limit of the relative frequency, a new deterministic process starts. And the
presence of °uctuations on the interaction between measurement apparatus
and physical entity are such that this new repeated measurement can give
rise deterministically to another outcome than the ¯rst one. The quantum
probability arises from the statistics of how each time again a new repeated
measurement can give rise to another outcome, although once started it
evolves deterministically.
As mentioned already, concrete realizable mechanical models that ex-
pose this situation were built, where it is possible to `see' how the quantum
structure arises as a consequence of the presence of °uctuations on the inter-
action between measurement and entity [17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, 32].
Speci¯cally these macroscopic mechanical models that give rise to quantum
structure inspired us to try out whether the formalism could be applied to
entities in other ¯elds of reality than the micro-physical world.
A ¯rst application was elaborated with the aim of describing the situation
of decision making. More concretely we made a model [33, 34] for an opinion
pole situation, where also persons without opinion can be described, and
the e®ect of the questioning during the opinion pole itself can be taken into
account.
We also constructed a cognitive situation where Bell inequalities are vi-
olated because of the presence of a nonKolmogorovian probability structure
in the cognitive situation [35]. We worked out in detail a description of the
liar paradox by means of the Hilbert space structure of standard quantum
mechanics [36, 37].
More recently our attention has gone to studies of cultural evolution
[38, 39], cognitive science, more speci¯cally the problem of the representa-
tion of concepts [38, 39], and biology with the aim of elaborating a global
evolution theory [39, 40]. One of the important insights that has grown dur-
ing the work on [38], and the work found in Liane Gabora's doctoral thesis
[39], is that experiments (or measurements) can be considered to be contexts
that in°uence the state of the entity under consideration in an indeterminis-
tic way, due to °uctuations that are present on the interaction between the
context and the entity. As we knew already from our work on the hidden
measurement approach, such indeterministic e®ects give rise to a general-
ized quantum structure for the description of the states and properties of the
entity under study. This makes it possible to classify dynamical evolution
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for classical and quantum entities and change due to measurements on the
same level: dynamical change being deterministic change due to dynamical
context and measurement change being indeterministic change due to mea-
surement context, the indeterminism ¯nding its origin on the presence of
°uctuations on the interaction between context and entity.
In the present article it is the ¯rst time that we present the formalism
taking into account this new insight that uni¯es dynamical change with
measurement change. As will be seen in the next sections, this makes it
necessary to introduce some fundamental changes in the approach.
1.3 States Can Change Context
Our investigations in biological and cultural evolution [38, 39, 40] have made
it clear that in general change will happen not only by means of an in°uence
of the context on the state of the entity under study, but also by means of
the in°uence of the state of the entity on the context itself. Interaction
between the entity and the context gives rise to a change of the state of
the entity, but also to a change of the context itself. This possibility was
not incorporated in earlier versions of the formalism. The version that we
propose in this paper takes it into account from the start, and introduces
an essential reformulation of the basic setting. In this paper, although we
introduce the possibility of change of the context under in°uence of the state
from the start, we will not focus on this aspect. We refer to [38, 39] for a
more detailed investigation of this e®ect, and more speci¯cally to [40] for a
full elaboration of it.
1.4 Filtering Out the Mathematical Structure
Already in the last versions of the formalism [1, 2] the power of making a
good distinction between the mathematical aspects of the formalism and its
physical foundations had been identi¯ed. Let us explain more concretely
what we mean. In the older founding papers [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], although
the physical foundation of the formalism is de¯ned in a clear way, and the
resulting mathematical structures are treated rigorously, it is not always
clear what are the `purely mathematical' properties of the structures that
are at the origin of the results. That is the reason that in more recent
work on the formalism we have made an attempt to divide up the physical
foundation and the resulting mathematical structure as much as possible.
We ¯rst explain in which way certain aspects of the mathematical structure
arise from the physical foundation, but then, in a second step, de¯ne these
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aspects in a strictly mathematical way, such that propositions and theorems
can be proven, `only' using the mathematical structure without physical
interpretation. Afterwards, the results of these propositions and theorems
can then be interpreted in a physical way again. This not only opens the
way for mathematicians to start working on the structures, but also lends a
greater axiomatic strength to the whole approach on the fundamental level.
More concretely, the mathematical structure of a state property system is
the the structure to be used to describe a physical entity by means of its
states and properties[1, 2, 41]. This step turned out to be fruitful from the
start, since we could prove that a state property system as a mathematical
structure is isomorphic to a closure space [1, 2, 41]. This means that the
mathematics of closure spaces can be translated to the mathematics of state
property systems, and in this sense becomes relevant for the foundations
of quantum mechanics. The step of dividing up the mathematics from the
physics in a systematic way also led to a scheme to derive the morphisms
for the structures that we consider from a covariance principle rooted in
the relation of a subentity to the entity of which it is a subentity[1, 41].
This paved the way to a categorical study of the mathematical structures
involved, which is the next new element of the recent advances that we want
to mention.
1.5 Identifying the Categorical Structure
Not only was it possible to connect with a state property system a closure
space in an isomorphic way, but, after we had introduced the morphisms
starting from a merological covariance principle, it was possible to prove that
the category of state property systems and their morphisms, that we have
named SP, is equivalent with the category of closure spaces and continuous
functions, denoted by Cls [1, 41]. More speci¯cally we could prove that SP
is the amnestic modi¯cation of Cls [42]. Meanwhile these new element in
the approach have lead to strong results.
It could be proven that some of the axioms of axiomatic quantum me-
chanics [43, 4, 5] correspond to separation properties of the corresponding
closure spaces [44]. More concretely, the axiom of state determination in
a state property system [1] is equivalent with the T0 separation axiom of
the corresponding closure space [44, 45], and the axiom of atomicity in a
state property system [1] is equivalent with the T1 separation axiom of the
corresponding closure space [46, 47]. More recently it has been shown that
`classical properties' [4, 6, 8, 9] of the state property system correspond to
clopen (open and closed) sets of the closure space [48, 49, 50], and, explic-
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itly making use of the categorical equivalence, a decomposition theorem for
a state property system into its nonclassical components can be proved that
corresponds to the decomposition of the corresponding closure space into its
connected components [48, 49, 50].
1.6 The Introduction of Probability
In [1, 2] we introduce for the ¯rst time probability on the same level as the
other concepts, such as states, properties and experiments. Indeed, in the
older approaches, probability was not introduced on an equally fundamental
level as it is the case for the concepts of state, property and experiment.
What probability fundamentally tries to do is to provide a `measure' for
the uncertainty that is present in the situation of entity and context. We
had introduced probability in a standard way in [1, 2] by means of a measure
on the interval [0;1] of the set R of real numbers. Meanwhile however it has
become clear that probability should better be introduced in a way that is
quite di®erent from the standard way. We have analyzed this problem in
detail in [51]. We come to the conclusion that it is necessary to de¯ne a
probability not as an object that is evaluated by a number in the interval
[0;1], as it is the case in standard probability theory, but as an object that
is evaluated by a subset of the interval [0;1]. We have called this type
of generalized probability { standard probability theory is retrieved when
the considered subsets of the interval [0;1] are the singletons { a `subset
probability'. Although a lot of work is still needed to make the subset
probability into a full grown probability theory, we will take it in account
for the elaboration of the formalism that we propose in this paper.
1.7 How We Will Proceed
We will take into account all the aspects mentioned in sections 1.1, 1.2, 1.3,
1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 for the foundations of the formalism that we introduce in
this paper. We also try to make the paper as self contained as possible,
such that it is not necessary for the reader to go through all the preceding
material to be able to understand it.
For sake of completeness we mention other work that has contributed to
advances in the approach that is less directly of importance for what we do
in this paper, but shows how the approach is developing into other directions
as well [52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69,
70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81].
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2 Foundations of the Formalism
In this section we introduce the basic ingredients of the formalism. Since we
want to be able to apply the formalism to many di®erent types of situations
the basic ingredients must be su±ciently general. The strategy that we
follow consists of describing more speci¯c situations as special cases of the
general situation. The primary concept that we consider is that of an entity,
that we will denote by S. Such an entity S can for example be a cat, or
a genome, or cultural artifact, such as a building, or an abstract idea, or a
mind of a person, or a stone, or a quantum particle, or a °uid etc ...
2.1 States, Contexts and Change
At a speci¯c moment, an entity, is in a speci¯c state. The state represents
what the entity is and how it reacts to di®erent contexts at that moment.
For example, a cat can be awake or asleep, this are two possible states of
the cat. The second basic concept that we consider is that of a context.
A context is a part of the outside reality of the entity that in°uences the
entity in such a way that its state is changed. If the cat is asleep, and
confronted with a context of heavy noise, it is probable that it will wake
up. The context `heavy noise' changes then the state `cat is asleep' into the
state `cat is awake'.
For a speci¯c entity S we denote the states of this entity by p;q;r;s;:::
and the contexts that the entity can be confronted with by e;f;g;h;:::. The
set of all relevant states of an entity S we denote by § and the set of all
relevant contexts by M.
Let us express the basic situation that we consider. An entity S, in a
state p, interacts with a context e. In general, the interaction between the
entity and the context causes a change of the state of the entity and also
a change of the context. Sometimes there will be no change of state or no
change of context: this situation we consider as a special case of the general
situation; we can for example call it a situation of zero change. Sometimes
the entity will be destroyed by the context with which it interacts. A context
that destroys the entity provokes a change of the state that the entity is in
before it interacts with this context, but this change is so strong that most
of the characteristic properties of the entity are destroyed, and hence the
remaining part of reality will not be identi¯ed any longer as the entity.
To be able to express the destruction within our formalism we introduce a
special state 0 2 §. If a context changes a speci¯c state p 2 § to the state
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0 2 § it means that the entity in question is destroyed by the context1. We
denote by §0 the set of all relevant states of the entity S without the state
of destruction 0. Let us introduce the basic notions in a formal way.
Basic Notion 1 (State, Context and Change). For an entity S we in-
troduce its set of relevant states § and its set of relevant contexts M. States
are denoted by p;q;r;s 2 § and contexts are denoted by e;f;g;h 2 M. The
state 0 2 § is the state that expresses that the entity is destroyed. By §0
we denote the set of states without the state 0 that represent the destroyed
entity. The situation where the entity S is in a state p 2 § and under in-
°uence of a context e 2 M will in general lead to a new situation where the
entity is in a state q 2 § and the context is f 2 M. The transition from
the couple (e;p) to the couple (f;q) we call the change of the entity in state
p under in°uence of the context e.
2.2 Probability
Probability theory has been developed to get a grip on indeterminism. Usu-
ally a probability is de¯ned by means of a measure on the interval [0;1] of
the set of real numbers R. As we mentioned already in section 1.6, we are
not convinced that the standard way to introduce probability is the good
way for our formalism. We have analyzed this problem in detail in [51] and
use the results obtained there.
De¯nition 1 (Probability of Change). Consider an entity S with a set
of states § and a set of contexts M. We introduce the function
¹ : M £ § £ M £ § ! P([0;1]) (1)
(f;q;e;p) 7! ¹(f;q;e;p) (2)
where ¹(f;q;e;p) is the probability for the couple (e;p) to change to the
couple (f;q). P([0;1]) is the set of all subsets of the interval [0;1]. This
means that we evaluate the probability by a subset of [0;1] and not a number
of [0;1] as in standard probability theory.
This is a generalization of standard probability theory that we retrieve when
all the considered subsets are singletons. It will become clear in the following
what are the advantages of this generalization as is also explained in detail
in [51]. We remark that if the probability that we introduce would be a
1The state 0 is not really a state in the proper sense, it is introduced speci¯cally to
take into account the possibility for a context to destroy the entity that we consider.
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traditional probability, where all the ¹(f;q;e;p) are singletons, we would
demand the following type of property to be satis¯ed:
X
f2M;q2§
¹(f;q;e;p) = 1 (3)
expressing the fact that the couple (e;p) is changed always to one of the
couples (f;q). This rule is usually referred to as the sum rule for probability.
For a subset probability the sum rule is much more complicated. We refer
to [51] for a more complete re°ection on this matter, but admit that the
matter has not been solved yet. In the course of this article we will make
use of the sum rule for subset probabilities only to express that indeed a
couple (e;p) is always changed to a couples (f;q).
2.3 States and Properties
A property is something that the entity `has' independent of the type of con-
text that the entity is confronted with. That is the reason why we consider
properties to be independent basic notions of the formalism. We denote
properties by a;b;c;::: and the set of all relevant properties of an entity by
L.
For a state we require that an entity is in a state at each moment .
The state represents the reality of the entity at that moment. Properties
are elements of this reality. This means that an entity S in a speci¯c state
p 2 § has di®erent properties that are actual. Properties that are actual for
the entity being in a speci¯c state can be potential for this entity in another
state.
Basic Notion 2 (Property). For an entity S, with set of states § and set
of contexts M, we introduce its set of properties. A property can be actual
for an entity in a speci¯c state and potential for this entity in another state.
We denote properties by a;b;c;:::, and the set of properties of S by L.
We introduce some additional concepts to be able to express the basic situa-
tion that we want to consider in relation with the state and the properties of
an entity. Suppose that the entity S is in a speci¯c state p 2 §. Then some
of the properties of S are actual and some are not and hence are potential.
This means that with each state p 2 § corresponds a set of actual properties,
subset of L. This de¯nes a function » : § ! P(L), which maps each state
p 2 § to the set »(p) of properties that are actual in this state. Introducing
this function makes it possible to replace the statement `property a 2 L is
actual for the entity S in state p 2 §' by `a 2 »(p)'.
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Suppose now that for the entity S a speci¯c property a 2 L is actual.
Then this entity is in a certain state p 2 § that makes a actual. With each
property a 2 L we can associate the set of states that make this property
actual, i.e. a subset of §. This de¯nes a function · : L ! P(§), which
makes each property a 2 L correspond to the set of states ·(a) that make
this property actual. Again we can replace the statement `property a 2 L
is actual if the entity S is in state p 2 §' by the set theoretical expression
`p 2 ·(a)'. Let us introduce these notions in a formal way.
De¯nition 2 (Aristotle Map). Consider an entity S, with set of states
§, set of contexts M and set of properties L. We de¯ne a function » : § !
P(L) such that »(p) is the set of all properties that are actual if the entity
is in state p. We call » the Aristotle map 2 of the entity S.
De¯nition 3 (Cartan Map). Consider an entity S, with set of states §,
set of contexts M and set of properties L. We de¯ne a function · : L !
P(§) such that ·(a) is the set of all states that make the property a actual.
We call · the Cartan map3.
By introducing the Aristotle map and the Cartan map we can express the
basic situation we want to consider for states and properties as follows:
a 2 »(p) , p 2 ·(a) , a is actual for S in state p (4)
If the state p 2 § of an entity is changed under in°uence of a context e 2 M
into a state q 2 §, then the set »(p) of actual properties in state p is changed
into the set »(q) of actual properties in state q. Contrary to the state of an
entity, a property is not changed under in°uence of the context. What can
be changed is its status of actual or potential. This change of status under
in°uence of the context is monitored completely by the change of state by
this context.
2.4 Covariance and Morphisms
We derive the morphism of our structure by making use of a merological
covariance principle. What we mean is that we will express for the situation
2We introduce the name Aristotle map for this function as a homage to Aristotle,
because he was the ¯rst to consider the set of actual properties as characteristic for the
state of the considered entity.
3The name Cartan map for this function was introduced in earlier formulations of the
formalism [4, 5] as an homage to Eli Cartan, who for the ¯rst time considered the state
space as the fundamental structure in the case of classical mechanics
11        
of an entity and subentity the covariance of the descriptions, and in this way
derive the morphisms of our structure.
Consider two entities S and S0 such that S is a subentity of S0. In that
case, the following three natural requirements should be satis¯ed:
i) If the entity S0 is in a state p0 then the state m(p0) of S is determined.
This de¯nes a function m from the set of states of S0 to the set of states of
S.
ii) If we consider a context e that in°uences the entity S, then this context
also in°uences the entity S0. This de¯nes a function l from the set of contexts
of S to the set of contexts of S0.
iii) When we consider a property a of S, then this corresponds to a property
n(a) of S0, which is the same property, but now considered as a property of
the big entity S0. This de¯nes a function n of L to L0.
iv) We want e and l(e) to be two descriptions of the `same' context, once
considered as a context that in°uences S and once considered as a context
that in°uences S0. This means that when we consider how e in°uences m(p0),
this is the same physical process as when we consider how l(e) in°uences
p0, with the only di®erence that the ¯rst time it is considered within the
description of the subentity S and the second time within the description of
the big entity S0. In a similar way we want property a to behave in the same
way towards the states of S as property n(a) behaves towards the states of
S0. As a consequence the following covariance principles hold:
¹(f;m(q0);e;m(p0)) = ¹0(l(f);q0;l(e);p0) (5)
a 2 »(m(p0)) , n(a) 2 »0(p0) (6)
We have now everything at hand to de¯ne a morphism of our structure.
De¯nition 4 (Morphisms). Consider two entities S and S0, with sets of
states §, §0, sets of contexts M, M0 and sets of properties L and L0, such
that probability is de¯ned as in de¯nition 1. We say that the triple (m, l, n)
is a morphism if m is a function:
m : §0 ! § (7)
l is a function:
l : M ! M0 (8)
and n is a function:
n : L ! L0 (9)
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such that for p0 2 §0, e 2 M and a 2 L the following holds:
¹(f;m(q0);e;m(p0)) = ¹0(l(f);q0;l(e);p0) (10)
a 2 »(m(p0)) , n(a) 2 »0(p0) (11)
Requirements (10) and (11) are the covariance formula's that characterize
the morphisms of our structure.
2.5 The Category of State Context Property Systems and
Their Morphisms
We de¯ne now the mathematical structure that we need to describe an entity
by means of its states, context and properties, in a purely mathematical way,
so that the structure can be studied mathematically.
De¯nition 5 (The Category SCOP). A state context property system
(§;M;L;¹;»), consists of three sets §, M, L and two functions ¹ and »,
such that
¹ : M £ § £ M £ § ! P([0;1]) (12)
» : § ! P(L) (13)
The sets §, M and L, play the role of the set of states, the set of contexts,
and the set of properties of an entity S. The function ¹ describes transition
probabilities between couples of contexts and states, while the function »
describes the sets of actual properties for the entity S being in di®erent
states.
Consider two state context property systems (§;M;L;¹;») and
(§0;M0;L0;¹0;»0). A morphism is a triple of functions (m;l;n) such that:
m : §0 ! § (14)
l : M ! M0 (15)
n : L ! L (16)
and the following formula's are satis¯ed:
¹(f;m(q0);e;m(p0)) = ¹0(l(f);q0;l(e);p0) (17)
a 2 »(m(p0)) , n(a) 2 »0(p0) (18)
We denote the category consisting of state context property systems and their
morphisms by SCOP.
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3 Classical and Quantum Entities
As we mentioned, our formalism must be capable to describe di®erent forms
of change that are encountered in nature for di®erent types of entities. Let
us consider some examples to show how this happens.
3.1 Classical and Quantum Dynamical Change
In this section we outline in which way the deterministic evolution of classical
physical entities described by the dynamical laws of classical physics and the
deterministic evolution of quantum entities described by the SchrÄ odinger
equation are described in the formalism.
For a classical mechanical entity in a certain state p under a context e
change is deterministic. A speci¯c couple (e;p) changes deterministically
into another couple (f;q). Quantum entities undergo two types of change.
One of them, referred to as the dynamical change and described by the
SchrÄ odinger equation, is also deterministic. The other one, referred to as
collapse and described by von Neumann's projection postulate, is indeter-
ministic. We consider in this section only the deterministic SchrÄ odinger type
of change for a quantum entity.
Let us consider ¯rst a concrete example of the classical mechanical
change. Place a charged iron ball in in a magnetic ¯eld. The ball will
be in°uenced by the context which is the magnetic ¯eld and start to move
according to the classical laws of electromagnetism. Knowing the context
at t0 and the state of the entity at t0 we can predict with certainty the
state of the entity at t1, t2 :::. If we consider the in°uence of the magnetic
¯eld from time t0 to time t1 as one context e(t0 7! t1) and the in°uence of
the magnetic ¯eld from time t1 till time t2 as another context e(t1 7! t2),
then the whole dynamical evolution can be seen as the change monitored
continuously by the set of contexts e(t1 7! t). All these contexts change the
state of the entity in a deterministic way.
The deterministic evolution of a quantum entity from time t1 to time t,
described in the standard quantum formalism by means of the SchrÄ odinger
equation, can be represented in our formalism in the same way, as the change
monitored continuously by the set of contexts e(t1 7! t).
Classical and quantum dynamical evolution are both characterized as a
continuous change by an in¯nite set of contexts that all change the state of
the entity in a deterministic way. We can specify this situation in the general
formalism. To be able to express in a nice way the speci¯c characteristics of
quantum and classical entities, we introduce the concept of range.
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De¯nition 6 (Range of a Context for a State). Consider a state con-
text property system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. For p 2 § and
e 2 M we introduce:
R(e;p) = fq j q 2 §; 9 f 2 M such that ¹(f;q;e;p) 6= f0gg (19)
and call R(e;p) the range of e for p.
The range of a context for a state is the set of states that this state can be
changed to under in°uence of this context. We can now easily de¯ne what
is a deterministic context to a state.
De¯nition 7 (Deterministic Context to a State). Consider a state con-
text property system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We call a context
e 2 M a deterministic context to a state p 2 § if R(e;p) = fqg. We call q
the image of the state p under the context e.
If e is a deterministic context to the state p, then the state p is changed
deterministically to its image state q under in°uence of the context e.
De¯nition 8 (Range of a Context). Consider a state context property
system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. For e 2 M we introduce:
R(e) = [p2§R(e;p) (20)
and call R(e) the range of the context e.
The range of a context e is the set of states that is reached by changes
provoked by e on any state of the entity. We can of course also de¯ne the
range of a state for a context. It is the set of contexts that this context can
change to under in°uence of this state.
De¯nition 9 (Range of a State for a Context). Consider a state con-
text property system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. For e 2 M and
p 2 § we introduce:
R(p;e) = ff j f 2 M; 9 q 2 § such that ¹(f;q;e;p) 6= f0gg (21)
and call R(p;e) the range of p for e.
This makes it easy to de¯ne what is a deterministic state to a context.
De¯nition 10 (Deterministic State to a Context). Consider a state con-
text property system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We call a state
p 2 § a deterministic state to a context e 2 M if R(p;e) = ffg. We call f
the image of the context e under the state p.
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If p is a deterministic state to the context e then the context e is changed
deterministically to its imagine context f under in°uence of the state p.
De¯nition 11 (Range of a State). Consider a state context property sys-
tem (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. For p 2 § we introduce:
R(p) = [e2MR(p;e) (22)
and call R(p) the range of the state p.
The range of a state p is the set of contexts that is reached by changes
provoked by p on any context of the entity.
De¯nition 12 (Deterministic Context State Couple). Consider a state
context property system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We call the
context e 2 M and the state p 2 § a deterministic context state couple, if
e is a deterministic context to p, and p is a deterministic state to e. Then
(e;p) changes deterministically to (f;q). We call (f;q) the image of (e;p).
De¯nition 13 (Deterministic Context). Consider a state context prop-
erty system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We say that a context
e 2 M is a deterministic context if it is a deterministic context to each state
p 2 §.
For quantum entities only the contexts that generate the dynamical change
of state described by the SchrÄ odinger equation are deterministic contexts.
For classical entities all contexts are deterministic.
De¯nition 14 (Deterministic State). Consider a state context property
system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We say that a state p 2 § is
a deterministic state if it is a deterministic state to any context e 2 M.
For quantum mechanics as well as for classical physics all states are deter-
ministic states. In physics we indeed do not in general consider an in°uence
of the state on the context.
We have now all the material to de¯ne what is in our general formalism
a d-classical entity.
De¯nition 15 (D-Classical Entity). Consider a state context property
system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We say that the entity S
is a d-classical entity if all its states and contexts are deterministic.
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The reason why we call such an entity a d-classical entity and not just a
classical entity is that our de¯nition only demands the classicality of the
entity towards the change of state that can be provoked by a context. There
exist other possible forms of classicality, for example towards the type of
properties that an entity can have. This is the reason the we prefer to call
the type of classicality that we introduce here d-classicality. In [50] the
structure related to d-classical entities is analyzed in detail.
We note that in our formalism it are the deterministic contexts that pro-
duce an entity to behave like the physical entities behave under dynamical
evolution, whether this is the evolution of classical physical entities under
any kind of context, or the evolution of quantum physical entities described
by the SchrÄ odinger equation.
3.2 Quantum Measurement Contexts
In the foregoing section we have seen that the context that gives rise to a
quantum evolution is a deterministic context. For quantum entities there
are also contexts that originate in the measurement. These contexts are not
deterministic. Let us see how their actions ¯t into the formalism. Consider
a quantum entity in a state p represented by a unit vector u(p) of a com-
plex Hilbert space H. A measurement context e in quantum mechanics is
described by a self-adjoint operator A(e) on this Hilbert space. In general,
a self-adjoint operator has a spectrum that consists of a point-like part and
a continuous part. In the point-like part of the spectrum, the state p is
transformed into one of the eigenstates represented by the eigenvectors cor-
responding to the points of the point-like part of the spectrum of A(e). For
the continuous part of the spectrum the situation is somewhat more compli-
cated. There are no points as outcomes here, but only intervals. To such an
interval corresponds a unique projection operator of the spectral resolution
of A(e), and the state p is then projected by this projection onto a vector
of the Hilbert space, which represents that state after the measurement.
3.3 Cultural Change and the Human Mind
Cultural change with the human mind as generating entity is very complex.
Here states as well as context will in general not be deterministic. How the
formalism can be applied there has been studied in [38, 39]. More speci¯cally
a situation describing `the invention of the torch' has been modelled in [39].
We will not consider this type of change in more detail in the present article
and refer to [40] for a formal approach concentrated on this case.
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3.4 Eigen States and Eigen Contexts
There is a type of determinism of a context towards a state and of a state
towards a context that we want to consider speci¯cally, namely when there
is no change at all.
De¯nition 16 (Eigenstate of a Context). Consider a state context prop-
erty system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. A state p 2 § is called
an eigenstate of the context e 2 M if the context e is deterministic to the
state p and the image of p under e is p itself.
Proposition 1. Consider a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;»)
describing an entity S. A state p 2 § is an eigenstate of the context e 2 M
i®
R(e;p) = fpg (23)
De¯nition 17 (Eigencontext of a State). Consider a state context prop-
erty system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. A context e 2 M is called
an eigencontext of the state p 2 § if the state p is deterministic to the context
e and the image of e under p is e itself.
Proposition 2. Consider a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;»)
describing an entity S. A context e 2 M is an eigencontext of the state
p 2 § i®
R(p;e) = feg (24)
The name eigenstate has been taken from quantum mechanics, because in-
deed if a quantum entity is in an eigenstate of the operator that represents
the considered measurement, then this state is not changed by the context
of this measurement. Experiments in classical physics are observations and
hence do not change the state of the physical entity.
4 Pre-Order Structures
Step by step we introduce additional structure in our formalism. As much
as possible we introduce this structure in an operational way, meaning that
we analyze carefully what is the meaning of the structure that we introduce
and how it is connected with reality. In this section we limit ourselves to
the identi¯cation of a natural pre-order structure on the set of states and
on the set of properties.
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4.1 State and Property Implication and Equivalence
Before introducing the state and property implications that will form pre-
order relations on § and L, let us ¯rst de¯ne what is a pre-order relation on
a set.
De¯nition 18 (Pre-order Relation and Equivalence). Suppose that we
have a set Z. We say that < is a pre-order relation on Z i® for x;y;z 2 Z
we have:
x < x
x < y and y < z ) x < z
(25)
For two elements x;y 2 Z such that x < y and y < x we denote x ¼ y and
we say that x is equivalent to y.
There exist natural `implication relations' on § and on L. If the situation
is such that if `a 2 L is actual for S in state p 2 §' implies that `b 2 L is
actual for S in state p 2 §' we say that property a `implies' property b. If
the situation is such that `a 2 L is actual for S in state q 2 §' implies that
`a 2 L is actual for S in state p 2 §' we say that the state p implies the
state q. Let us introduce these two implications in a formal way.
De¯nition 19 (State Implication and Property Implication). Consi-
der a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S.
For a;b 2 L we introduce:
a < b , ·(a) ½ ·(b) (26)
and we say that a `implies' b. For p;q 2 § we introduce:
p < q , »(q) ½ »(p) (27)
and we say that p `implies' q 4.
It is easy to verify that the implication relations that we have introduced
are pre-order relations.
Proposition 3. Consider a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;»)
describing an entity S. Then §;< and L;< are pre-ordered sets.
We can prove the following:
4Remark that the state implication and property implication are not de¯ned in a
completely analogous way. Indeed, then we should have written p < q , »(p) ½ »(q).
That we have chosen to de¯ne the state implication the other way around is because
historically this is how intuitively is thought about states implying one another.
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Proposition 4. Consider a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;»)
describing an entity S. (1) Suppose that a;b 2 L and p 2 §. If a 2 »(p) and
a < b, then b 2 »(p). (2) Suppose that p;q 2 § and a 2 L. If q 2 ·(a) and
p < q then p 2 ·(a).
Proof: (1) We have p 2 ·(a) and ·(a) ½ ·(b). This proves that p 2 ·(b) and
hence b 2 »(p). (2) We have a 2 »(q) and »(q) ½ »(p) and hence a 2 »(p).
This shows that p 2 ·(a).
It is possible to prove that the morphisms of the category SCOP conserves
the two implications.
Proposition 5. Consider two state context property systems (§;M;L;¹;»)
and (§0;M0;L0;¹0;»0) describing entities S and S0, and a morphism (m;l;n)
between these two state context. For p0;q0 2 §0 and a;b 2 L we have:
p0 < q0 , m(p0) < m(q0) (28)
a < b , n(a) < n(b) (29)
Proof: Suppose that p0 < q0. This means that »0(q0) ½ »0(p0). Consider
a 2 »(m(q0)). Using 18 implies that n(a) 2 »(q0). But then n(a) 2 »(p0)
and again using 18 we have a 2 »0(m(p0)). This means that we have shown
that »(m(q0)) ½ »(m(q0)). As a consequence we have m(p0) < m(q0). This
proves one of the implications of 28. Suppose now that m(p0) < m(q0),
which implies »(m(q0)) ½ »(m(p0)). Consider a 2 »0(q0). Form 18 follows
that n(a) 2 »(m(q0)) and hence also n(a) 2 »(m(p0)). Again from 18 follows
that a 2 »0(p0). So we have shown that »0(q0) ½ »0(p0), and as a consequence
p0 < q0. Formula 29 is proven in a completely analogous way.
5 Experiments And Preparations
Some contexts are used to perform an experiment on the entity under con-
sideration and other context are used to prepare a state of the entity. We
want to study these types of context more carefully, because they will play
an important role in further operational foundations of the formalism. Let
us analyze what requirements are to be ful¯lled for a context to be an ex-
periment.
For a context that is an experiment the context will change under in°u-
ence of the state in such a way that from the new context we can determine
the outcome of the experiment. What are then outcomes of an experiment?
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5.1 Outcomes of Experiments
For a context to play the role of an experiment it must be possible to identify
outcomes of the experiment. We will denote outcomes by x;y;z;:::, and the
set of possible outcomes corresponding to an experiment e 2 M, the entity
being in state p 2 §, by O(e;p). Obviously, the set of all possible outcomes
of the experiment e is then given by [p2§O(e;p) = O(e).
If we consider the experimental practice in di®erent scienti¯c domains
there does not seem to be a standard way to identify outcomes. In general
the description of an outcome of an experiment e on an entity S in state p is
linked to the state of the entity after the e®ect of the context, hence to the
type of change that has been provoked by the experiment, and also to the
experiment itself, and to the new context that arises after the experiment
has been performed.
This means that, if we consider a context e that we want to use as
an experiment, and suppose that the entity is in state p, and that q is
a possible state that the entity can change to under context e, and f is a
possible context after e has worked on p, then a possible outcome x(f;q;e;p)
for e will occur. But it might well be that another possible state r that
the entity might evolve to under context e, identi¯es the same outcome
x(f;r;e;p) = x(f;q;e;p) for e. This is the case when state q only di®ers from
state r in aspects that are not relevant for the physical quantity measured
by the experiment e. Let us give an example to explain what we mean.
Suppose that we consider a classical physics entity S that is a point
particle located motionless on a line that we have coordinated by the set of
real numbers R. The state of the particle in classical physics is described by
its position u and its momentum mv, where m is its mass and v its velocity,
hence by the vector (u;mv) 2 R2. Our experiment e consists of making a
picture of the particle. On the picture we can read o® the coordinate where
the particle is, hence its position. The set of possible outcomes O(e) for
this experiment is a part of the set of real numbers R, namely the points
described by the coordinate u, the position coordinate of the particle. The
context e is all what takes place when we make the picture, but without the
picture being taken, which means that for e the ¯lm in the camera has not
been exposed. This context e changes after the experiment into f where
the ¯lm has been exposed. The experiment e is just an observation, not
provoking any change on the state. If for example outcome x 2 R occurs,
we know that the position u of the particle equals x. The experiment not
only does not change the state of the particle, it is also a deterministic
context. Indeed O(e;(u;mv)) = fug for all states (u;mv) 2 R2. In this
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example the experiment gathers knowledge about the state of the entity
that we did not have before we performed the experiment.
Let us consider the example of a one dimensional quantum particle,
described by a state that is a wave function Ã(x), element of L2(R) such
that Z
kÃ(x)k2dx = 1
The context related to a position measurement is described by a self-adjoint
operator with a set of spectral projection operators that are the characteris-
tic functions Â­ of subsets ­ ½ R. The probability for the quantum particle
to be located in the subset ­ ½ R by the e®ect of the context is given by
Z
­
kÃ(x)k2dx
and, if the particle is located in the subset ­, the state Ã(x) is changed into
the state
1
qR
­ kÃ(x)k2dx
¢ Â­ ± Ã(x) (30)
In this new state, given by (30), the probability to be located in ­, if the
position context is applied again to the quantum particle, is given by:
Z
k
1
qR
­ kÃ(x)k2dx
¢ Â­ ± Ã(x)k2dx = 1
That is the reason that we can consider the subset ­ as an outcome for the
position experiment.
De¯nition 20 (Experiment). Consider a state context property system
(§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We say that a context e 2 M is an
experiment if for p 2 § there exists a set O(e;p) and a map:
x : M £ § £ M £ § ! O(e;p) (31)
(f;q;e;p) 7! x(f;q;e;p) (32)
where x(f;q;e;p) is the outcome of experiment e for the entity in state p,
and where (e;p) has changed to (f;q). We further have that:
¹(f;q;e;p) 6= f0g (33)
expressing that an outcome for e is only possible if the transition probability
from (e;p) to (f;q) is di®erent from f0g. We denote q = Pe
x(p). The
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probability for the experiment e to give outcome x if the entity is in state p
equals
¹(e;Pe
x(p);e;p) (34)
For x 2 O(e;p) \ O(e;r) we have:
Pe
x(p) = Pe
x(r) (35)
The de¯nition of an experiment that we have given here is still very general.
As we saw already, in classical physics an experiment is usually an observa-
tion, which is a much more speci¯c type of experiment. An observation just
`observes' the state of the entity that is there without provoking any kind
of change. Also in quantum mechanics an experiment is much less general
than the de¯nition that we have given here.
5.2 Contexts and Experiments of the First Kind
In quantum mechanics an experiment provokes a change of state such that
the state after the experiment is an eigenstate of this experiment, and the
outcome is identi¯ed by means of this eigenstate. Experiments with this
property have been called experiments of the ¯rst kind in physics.
De¯nition 21 (Contexts of the First Kind). Consider a state context
property system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We say that a context
e 2 M is a context of the ¯rst kind if for p 2 §, we have that (e;p) changes
to (f;q), with f 2 M and q 2 §, where q is an eigenstate of f.
This means that for a context of the ¯rst kind, when f is being applied again
and again to the entity, its state will remain q. This means that the entity
has been changed into a stable state that no longer changes under in°uence
of context. This is a perfect situation to be able to identify an outcome of
an experiment by means of this eigenstate.
De¯nition 22 (Experiment of the First Kind). Consider a state con-
text property system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We say that
e 2 M is an experiment of the ¯rst kind if e is an experiment and a context
of the ¯rst kind. This means that for p 2 § we have that Pe
x(p) is an eigen-
state of e, in the sense that ¹(e;Pe
x(p);e;Pe
x(p)) = f1g, and the experiment
e makes occur the outcome x with probability equal to 1.
An experiment of the ¯rst kind pushes each state of the entity into an eigen-
state of this experiment. This is the way that experiments act in quantum
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mechanics. Let us consider again the example of the experiment that mea-
sures the position of a quantum particle. The state Ã(x) is changed to the
state
1
qR
­ kÃ(x)k2dx
¢ Â­ ± Ã(x)
if we test whether the outcome is the interval ­ ½ R. If we test again
whether the outcome is in the subset ­, the state does not change any
longer, because
Â­(
1
qR
­ kÃ(x)k2dx
¢ Â­ ± Ã(x)) =
1
qR
­ kÃ(x)k2dx
¢ Â­ ± Ã(x)
The set of outcomes for a quantum entity has the structure of the set of all
subsets of another set, this other set being the spectrum of the self-adjoint
operator that represents the experiment in quantum mechanics. But there
is more. Let us consider two consecutive measurements of position, once in
the subset ­1 and second in the subset ­2, such that ­2 ½ ­1 ½ R. First,
for ­1 the state Ã(x) changes to
1
qR
­1 kÃ(x)k2dx
¢ Â­1 ± Ã(x)
with probability Z
­1
kÃ(x)k2dx
Remark ¯rst that:
Z
­2
k
1
qR
­1 kÃ(x)k2dx
¢ Â­1 ± Ã(x)k2dx =
R
­2 kÃ(x)k2dx
R
­1 kÃ(x)k2dx
This means that for the second change of state the probability equals to:
R
­2 kÃ(x)k2dx
R
­1 kÃ(x)k2dx
and the state
1
qR
­1 kÃ(x)k2dx
¢ Â­1 ± Ã(x)
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is changed to
sR
­1 kÃ(x)k2dx
R
­2 kÃ(x)k2dx
¢ Â­2 ±
1
qR
­1 kÃ(x)k2dx
¢ Â­1 ± Ã(x)
Taking into account that Â­2 ±Â­1 ±Ã(x) = Â­2 ±Ã(x) because ­2 ½ ­1 we
have that the ¯nal state is:
1 R
­2 kÃ(x)k2dx
¢ Â­2 ± Ã(x)
This is exactly the state that we would have found if we would immediately
have measured the position with a test to see that the quantum particle
is localized in the subset ­2. And also the probabilities multiply, namely
the probability to ¯nd the position in subset ­2 with a direct test on ­2
is the product of the probability to ¯nd it in ­1 with a test on ­1, with
the probability to ¯nd it in ­2 after it had already been tested for ­1.
The process that we have identi¯ed here for the position measurement of a
quantum entity is generally true for all quantum mechanical measurements.
Quantum mechanical measurement have a kind of cascade structure. Let
us introduce this structure for a general experiment and call it a cascade
experiment. To be able to do so we need to de¯ne what we mean by the
product of two subsets of the interval [0;1] and also what we mean by 1
minus this subset for a subset of [0;1].
De¯nition 23. Suppose that A;B;C 2 P([0;1]) of the interval [0;1]. We
de¯ne:
1 ¡ A = f1 ¡ x j x 2 Ag (36)
B ¢ C = fx ¢ y j x 2 B;y 2 Cg (37)
Obviously 1 ¡ A 2 P([0;1]) whenever A 2 P([0;1]) and A ¢ B 2 P([0;1])
whenever A;B 2 P([0;1]).
De¯nition 24 (Cascade Experiment). Consider a state context prop-
erty system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. An experiment e 2 M
is a cascade experiment if there exists a set E such that the set of out-
comes O(e) of e is a subset P(E), hence O(e) ½ P(E). For p 2 §, and
x;y;z;t 2 O(e) such that x ½ y and z [ t = E and z \ t = ;, we have:
Pe
y(Pe
x(p)) = Pe
x(p) (38)
¹(e;Pe
x(p);e;Pe
x(p)) = f1g (39)
¹(e;Px(p);e;p) = ¹(e;Px(p);e;Py(p)) ¢ ¹(e;Py(p);e;p) (40)
¹(e;Pz(p);e;p) = 1 ¡ ¹(e;Pt(p);e;p) (41)
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We call E the spectrum of the experiment e.
Note that the elements of the spectrum E for an experiment e are not nec-
essarily outcomes of the experiment e. Indeed, for example for the position
measurement of a free quantum particle, the spectrum of the position op-
erator is a subset of the set of real numbers R, namely the spectrum of the
self-adjoint operator corresponding to this position measurement, but none
of the numbers of the spectrum is an outcome. Only subsets of this spec-
trum with measure di®erent from zero are outcomes, because the spectrum
is continuous.
5.3 An Extra Condition For the Morphisms
When some of the contexts are experiments we can derive from the merolog-
ical covariance situation an extra condition to be ful¯lled for the morphisms
of SCOP.
De¯nition 25. Consider two state context property systems (§;M;L;¹)
and (§0;M0;L0;¹0). If e 2 M is an experiment, then also l(e) 2 M0 is an
experiment, and for p0 2 §0 there exists a bijection k
k : O(e;m(p0)) ! O(l(e);p0) (42)
which expresses that we use the same outcomes whether we experiment on
the big entity S0 or on the subentity S.
5.4 Preparations
Context are also used to prepare the state of an entity. For a context to
function as a preparation it is necessary that it brings the entity in a speci¯c
state under its in°uence.
De¯nition 26 (Preparation). Consider a state context property system
(§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We say that a context e 2 M is a
preparation if there exists a state p 2 § such that R(e) = fpg. We call p the
state prepared by the context e.
So a context is a preparation if it provokes a change such that each state of
the entity is brought to one and the same state. This is then the prepared
state.
26            
6 Meet Properties and Join States
Suppose we consider a set of properties (ai)i 2 L. It is very well possible
that there exist states of the entity S in which all the properties ai are
actual. This is in fact always the case if \i·(ai) 6= ;. Indeed, if we consider
p 2 \i·(ai) and S in state p, then all the properties ai are actual. If there
corresponds a new property with the situation where all properties ai of a
set (ai)i and no other are actual, we will denote such a new property by
^iai, and call it a `meet property' of all ai. Clearly we have ^iai is actual
for S in state p 2 § i® ai is actual for all i for S in state p. This means that
we have ^iai 2 »(p) i® ai 2 »(p) 8i.
Suppose now that we consider a set of states (pj)j 2 § of the entity S.
It is very well possible that there exist properties of the entity such that
these properties are actual if S is in any one of the states pj. This is in
fact always the case if \j»(pj) 6= ;. Indeed suppose that a 2 \j»(pj). Then
we have that a 2 »(pj) for each one of the states pj, which means that a is
actual if S is in any one of the states pj. If it is such that there corresponds
a new state to the situation where S is in any one of the states pj, we will
denote such new state by _jpj and call a `join state' of all pj. We can see
that a property a 2 L is actual for S in a state _jpj i® this property a is
actual for S in any of the states pj
5. The existence of meet properties and
join states gives additional structure to § and L.
De¯nition 27 (Property Completeness). Consider a state context prop-
erty system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We say that we have
`property completeness' i® for an arbitrary set (ai)i;ai 2 L of properties
there exists a property ^iai 2 L such that for an arbitrary state p 2 §:
^iai 2 »(p) , ai 2 »(p) 8 i (43)
Such a property ^iai is called a meet property of the set of properties (ai)i.
De¯nition 28 (State Completeness). Consider a state context property
system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We say that we have `state
5A join state and meet property are not unique. But two join states and two meet
properties corresponding to the same sets are equivalent. We remark that we could also
try to introduce join properties and meet states. It is however a subtle but deep property
of reality, that this cannot be done on the same level. We will understand this better
when we study in the next section more of the operational aspects of the formalism. We
will see there that only meet properties and join states can be operationally de¯ned in the
general situation.
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completeness' i® for an arbitrary set of states (pj)j;pj 2 § there exists a
state _jpj 2 § such that for an arbitrary property a 2 L:
_jpj 2 ·(a) , pj 2 ·(a) 8 j (44)
Such a state _jpj is called a join state of the set of states (pj)j.
The following de¯nition explains why we have introduced the concept com-
pleteness.
De¯nition 29 (Complete Pre-ordered Set). Suppose that Z;< is a pre-
ordered set. We say that Z is a complete pre-ordered set i® for each subset
(xi)i;xi 2 Z of elements of Z there exists an in¯mum and a supremum in
Z6.
Proposition 6. Consider a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;»)
describing an entity S, and suppose that we have property completeness and
state completeness. Then §;< and L;< are complete pre-ordered sets.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary set (ai)i;ai 2 L. We will show that ^iai
is an in¯mum. First we have to proof that ^iai < ak 8 k. This follows
immediately from (43) and the de¯nition of < given in (26). Indeed, from
this de¯nition follows that we have to prove that ·(^iai) ½ ·(ak) 8 k.
Consider p 2 ·(^iai). From (4) follows that this implies that ^iai 2 »(p).
Through (43) this implies that ak 2 »(p) 8 k. If we apply (4) again this
proves that p 2 ·(ak) 8 k. So we have shown that ·(^iai) ½ ·(ak) 8 k.
This shows already that ^iai is a lower bound for the set (ai)i. Let us now
show that it is a greatest lower bound. So consider another lower bound, a
property b 2 L such that b < ak 8 k. Let us show that b < ^iai. Consider
p 2 ·(b), then we have p 2 ak 8 k since b is a lower bound. This gives
us that ak 2 »(p) 8 k, and as a consequence ^iai 2 »(p). But this shows
that p 2 ·(^iai). So we have proven that b < ^iai and hence ^iai is an
in¯mum of the subset (ai)i. Let us now prove that _jpj is a supremum of
the subset (pj)j. The proof is very similar, but we use (44) in stead of (43).
Let us again ¯rst show that _jpj is an upper bound of the subset (pj)j.
We have to show that pl < _jpj 8 l. This means that we have to prove
that »(_jpj) ½ »(pl) 8 l. Consider a 2 »(_jpj), then we have _jpj 2 ·(a).
From (44) it follows that pl 2 ·(a) 8 l. As a consequence, and applying
6An in¯mum of a subset (xi)i of a pre-ordered set Z is an element of Z that is smaller
than all the xi and greater than any element that is smaller than all xi. A supremum of
a subset (xi)i of a pre-ordered set Z is an element of Z that is greater than all the xi and
smaller than any element that is greater than all the xi.
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(4), we have that a 2 »(pl) 8 l. Let is now prove that it is a least upper
bound. Hence consider another upper bound, meaning a state q, such that
pl < q 8 l. This means that »(q) ½ »(pl) 8 l. Consider now a 2 »(q), then
we have a 2 »(pl) 8 l. Using again (4), we have pl 2 ·(a) 8 l. From (44)
follows then that _jpj 2 ·(a) and hence a 2 »(_jaj).
We have shown now that ^iai is an in¯mum for the set (ai)i;ai 2 L,
and that _jpj is a supremum for the set (pj)j;pj 2 §. It is a mathematical
consequence that for each subset (ai)i;ai 2 L, there exists also a supremum
in L, let is denote it by _iai, and that for each subset (pj)j;pj 2 §, there
exists also an in¯mum in §, let us denote it by ^jpj. They are respectively
given by _iai = ^x2L;aiÁx8i x and ^jpj = _y2§;yÁpj8j y7.
For both L and § it can be shown that this implies that there is at least one
minimal and one maximal element. Indeed, an in¯mum of all elements of
L is a minimal element of L and an in¯mum of the empty set is a maximal
element of L. In an analogous way a supremum of all elements of § is
a maximal element of § and a supremum of the empty set is a minimal
element of §. Of course there can be more minimal and maximal elements.
If a property a 2 L is minimal we will express this by a ¼ 0 and if a property
b 2 L is maximal we will express this by b ¼ I. An analogous notation will
be used for the maximal and minimal states.
When there is property completeness and state completeness we can
specify the structure of the maps » and · somewhat more after having
introduced the concept of `property state' and `state property'.
Proposition 7. Consider a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;»)
describing an entity S, and suppose that we have property completeness and
state completeness. For p 2 § we de¯ne the `property state' corresponding
to p as the property s(p) = ^a2»(p)a. For a 2 L we de¯ne the `state property'
corresponding to a as the state t(a) = _p2·(a)p. We have two maps :
t : L ! § a 7! t(a)
s : § ! L p 7! s(p)
(45)
and for a;b 2 L, and (ai)i;ai 2 L and p;q 2 § and (pj)j;pj 2 § we have :
a < b , t(a) < t(b)
p < q , s(p) < s(q)
t(^iai) ¼ ^it(ai)
s(_jpj) ¼ _js(pj)
(46)
7We remark that the supremum for elements of L and the in¯mum for elements of §,
although they exists, as we have proven here, have no simple operational meaning.
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Proof: Suppose that p < q. Then we have »(q) ½ »(p). From this follows
that s(p) = ^a2»(p)a < ^a2»(q)a = s(q). Suppose now that s(p) < s(q).
Take a 2 »(q), then we have s(q) < a. Hence also s(p) < a. But this implies
that a 2 »(p). Hence this shows that »(q) ½ »(p) and as a consequence
we have p < q. Because ^iai < ak 8 k we have t(^iai) < t(ak) 8k. This
shows that t(^iai) is a lower bound for the set (t(ai))i. Let us show that
it is a greatest lower bound. Suppose that p < t(ak) 8 k. We remark that
t(ak) 2 ·(ak). Then it follows that p 2 ·(ak) 8 k. As a consequence we have
ak 2 »(p) 8 k. But then ^iai 2 »(p) which shows that p 2 ·(^iai). This
proves that p < t(^iai). So we have shown that t(^iai) is a greatest lower
bound and hence it is equivalent to ^it(ai).
Proposition 8. Consider a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;»)
describing an entity S, and suppose that we have property completeness and
state completeness. For p 2 § we have »(p) = [s(p);+1] = fa 2 L j s(p) <
ag. For a 2 L we have ·(a) = [¡1;t(a)] = fp 2 § j p < t(a)g.
Proof: Consider b 2 [s(p);+1]. This means that s(p) < b, and hence b 2
»(p). Consider now b 2 »(p). Then s(p) < b and hence b 2 [s(p);+1].
If p is a state such that »(p) = ;, this means that there is no property actual
for the entity being in state p. We will call such states `improper' states.
Hence a `proper' state is a state that makes at least one property actual. In
an analogous way, if ·(a) = ;, this means that there is no state that makes
the property a actual. Such a property will be called an `improper' property.
A `proper' property is a property that is actual for at least one state.
De¯nition 30 (Proper States and Properties). Consider a state con-
text property system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. We call p 2 § a
`proper' state i® »(p) 6= ;. We call a 2 L a `proper' property i® ·(a) 6= ;. A
state p 2 § such that »(p) = ; is called an `improper' state, and a property
a 2 L such that ·(a) = ; is called an `improper' property.
It easily follows from proposition 8 that when there is property completeness
and state completeness there are no improper states (I ¼ ^; 2 »(p)) and
no improper properties (0 ¼ _; 2 ·(a)). Let us ¯nd out how the morphism
behave in relation with `meet' and `join'.
Proposition 9. Consider two state context property systems (§;M;L;¹;»)
and (§0;M0;L0;¹0;»0) describing entities S and S0 that are property and state
complete, and a morphism (m;l;n) between (§;M;L;¹;») and
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(§0;M0;L0;¹0;»0). For (ai)i 2 L and (p0
j)j 2 §0 we have:
n(^iai) ¼ ^in(ai) (47)
m(_jp0
j) ¼ _jm(p0
j) (48)
Proof: Because ^iai < aj 8j we have n(^iai) < n(aj) 8j. From this follows
that n(^iai) < ^in(ai). There remains to prove that ^in(ai) < n(^iai).
Suppose that ^in(ai) 2 »0(p0). Then n(aj) 2 »0(p0) 8j, which implies that
aj 2 »(m(p0)) 8j. As a consequence we have ^iai 2 »(m(p0)). From this
follows that n(^iai) 2 »0(p0). So we have proven that ^in(ai) < n(^iai).
Formula 48 is proven in an analogous way.
7 Operationality
We have introduced states, contexts and properties for a physical entity. In
this section we analyze in which way operationality introduces connections
between these concepts.
7.1 Testing Properties and Operationality
Experiments can be used to measure many things, and in this sense they can
also be used to test properties. Let us explain how this works. Consider an
experiment e 2 M and a property a 2 L. If there exists a subset A ½ O(e)
of the outcome set of e, such that the property a is actual i® the outcome
of e is contained in A, we say that e tests the property a.
De¯nition 31 (Test of a Property). Consider a state context property
system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. If for a property a 2 L there
is an experiment e 2 M, and a subset A ½ O(e) of the outcome set of e,
such that:
a 2 »(p) , O(e;p) ½ A (49)
We say that e is a `test' for the property a.
If all the properties of the entity that we consider can be tested by an
experiment, we say that we have operationality, or that our entity is an
operational entity.
De¯nition 32 (Operational Entity). Consider a state context property
system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. If for each property a 2 L
there is an experiment e 2 M that tests this property, and if moreover the
experiments to test the properties are such that for two properties a;b 2 L
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we have at least experiments e;f 2 M that test respectively a and b such
that O(e) \ O(f) = ;, we say that the entity S is an operational entity.
Of course, for an operational entity, it is not necessary to give the set of
properties apart, they can be derived from the rest of the mathematical
structure. We have done this explicitly in [51] for the case where all ex-
periment contexts are yes/no-experiments. It is possible to generalize the
construction of [51]. For this reason we need to introduce what we will call
a state context system.
De¯nition 33 (The Category SCO). A state context system (§;M;¹)
consists of two sets § and M, and a function
¹ : M £ § £ M £ § ! P([0;1]) (50)
The sets § and M play the role of the set of states and the set of contexts
of an entity S, and the function ¹ describes the transition probability. Con-
sider two state context systems (§;M;¹) and (§0;M0;¹0). A morphism is
a couple of functions (m;l) such that:
m : §0 ! § (51)
l : M ! M0 (52)
and the following formula is satis¯ed:
¹(f;m(q0);e;m(p0)) = ¹(l(f);q0;l(e);p0) (53)
Further we have that if e 2 M is an experiment, then also l(e) 2 M0 is an
experiment and for p0 2 §0 we have a bijection k:
k : O(e;m(p0)) ! O(l(e);p0) (54)
We denote the category of state context systems and their morphisms by
SCO.
For such a state context system we can construct the set of properties that
are testable by experiments of M, and this will deliver us a state context
property system for an operational entity. Let us see how this works.
De¯nition 34. Suppose that we have a state context system (§;M;¹). We
de¯ne:
L = fA j 9 e 2 M; e experiment and A ½ O(e)g (55)
» : § ! P(L) (56)
A 2 »(p) , O(e;p) ½ A (57)
and call (§;M;L;¹;») the state context property system related to (§;M;¹).
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Proposition 10. Suppose that (§;M;L;¹;») and (§0;M0;L0;¹0;»0) are the
state context property systems related to the state context systems (§;M;¹)
and (§0;M0;¹)0. A morphism (m;l) between (§;M;¹) and (§0;M0;¹)0 de-
termines a morphism (m;l;n) between (§;M;L;¹;») and (§0;M0;L0;¹0;»0).
Proof: Consider A 2 L. This means that 9 e 2 M where e is an experiment,
and A ½ O(e). We know that l(e) 2 M0 is also an experiment, and if we
consider k(A), where k is the bijection of (54) we have k(A) ½ O(l(e)) =
k(O(e)). This means that k(A) 2 L0. Let us de¯ne:
n : L ! L0 (58)
A 7! k(A) (59)
Take p0 2 §0 and A 2 L. We have A 2 »(m(p0)) , O(e;m(p0)) ½ A ,
k(O(e;m(p0))) ½ k(A) , O(l(e);p0) ½ n(A) , n(A) 2 »0(p0). This means
that (m;l;n) is a morphism between (§;M;L;¹;») and (§0;M0;L0;¹0;»0).
We introduce in the next section speci¯c types of contexts and states that
make it possible to test the meet property and deliver a join state for our
entity.
7.2 Product Contexts and Product States
Suppose that we consider a set of contexts (ei)i. In general it will be possible
for only one of these contexts to be realized together with an entity S. We
can however consider the following operation: we choose one of the contexts
of the set (ei)i and realize this context together with the entity S. We
can consider this operation together with the set of contexts (ei)i as a new
context. Let us denote it as ¦iei and call it the product context of the
set (ei)i. It is interesting to note that the product of di®erent contexts
gives rise to indeterminism. In earlier work we have been able to prove
that the quantum type of indeterminism is exactly due to the fact that each
experiment is the product of some hidden experiments. We have called this
explanation of the quantum probability structure the `hidden measurement'
approach[18, 19, 32]. In [51] we analyze in detail how we have to introduce
the product experiment in a mathematical way, and it is shown how a subset
probability is necessary for this purpose.
De¯nition 35 (Product Context). Consider a state context property sys-
tem (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. Suppose we have a set of contexts
(ei)i 2 M. The product context ¦iei is de¯ned in the following way. For
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p;q 2 § and f 2 M we have:
¹(f;q;¦iei;p) = [i¹(f;q;ei;p) (60)
Proposition 11. Consider a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;»)
describing an entity S. For the product context ¦iei of a set of contexts
(ei)i 2 M we have for p 2 §:
R(¦iei;p) = [iR(ei;p) (61)
Proof: Suppose now that q 2 R(¦iei;p). This means that there exist f 2 M
such that ¹(f;q;¦iei;p) 6= f0g. Hence [i¹(f;q;ei;p) 6= f0g, which means
that there is at least j such that ¹(f;q;ej;p) 6= f0g. This shows that
q 2 R(ej;p), and hence q 2 [iR(ei;p). On the contrary, suppose that
q 2 [iR(ei;p). This means that there is at least one j such that q 2 R(ej;p).
Hence there exist f 2 M such that ¹(f;q;ej;p) 6= f0g. As a consequence
we have [i¹(f;q;ei;p) 6= f0g, and hence ¹(f;q;¦iei;p) 6= f0g, which shows
that q 2 R(¦iei;p). This proves (61).
Proposition 12. Consider a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;»)
describing an entity S. Suppose that (ei)i is a set of experiments. We have:
O(¦iei;p) = [iO(ei;p) (62)
Proof: Suppose that x 2 O(¦iei;p). This means that there exist q 2 § and
f 2 M such that ¹(f;q;¦iei;p) 6= f0g, and x occurs whenever p changes
into q. Because of (60) we have [i¹(f;q;ei;p) 6= f0g. This means that
there is at least one j such that ¹(f;q;ej;p) 6= f0g. Hence x is a possible
outcome of ej that occurs when p is changed into q by ej. As a consequence
we have x 2 O(ej;p), and hence x 2 [iO(ei;p). On the contrary, suppose
now that x 2 [iO(ei;p). This means that there is at least one j such that
x 2 O(ej;p). This means that there exist q 2 § and f 2 M such that
¹(f;q;ej;p) 6= f0g, and x is the outcome that occurs when ej changes the
state p to the state q. As a consequence we have [i¹(f;q;ei;p) 6= f0g, which
means that ¹(f;q;¦iei;p) 6= f0g, which means that x also occurs when ¦iei
changes the state p to q. Hence x 2 O(¦iei;p). This proves (62).
Suppose that we consider a set of states (pi)i 2 §. Then it is possible to
consider a situation where the entity is in one of these states, but we do not
know which one, as a new state, that we will call the product state ¦ipi of
the set of states (pi)i. More speci¯cally we de¯ne the product state as the
state that is prepared by a product of contexts that are preparations.
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De¯nition 36 (Product State). Consider a state context property sys-
tem (§;M;L;¹;») describing an entity S. Suppose that (pi)i 2 § is a set of
states. The product state ¦ipi is de¯ned in the following way, for e;f 2 M
and q 2 § we have:
¹(f;q;e;¦ipi) = [i¹(f;q;e;pi) (63)
Proposition 13. Consider a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;»)
describing an entity S. For the product state ¦ipi of a set of states (pi)i 2 §
we have for e 2 M:
R(e;¦ipi) = [iR(e;pi) (64)
Proof: Suppose that q 2 R(e;¦ipi). This means that there exists f 2 M
such that ¹(f;q;e;¦ipi) 6= f0g. Hence [i¹(f;q;e;pi) 6= f0g. This means
that there is at least one j such that ¹(f;q;e;pj) 6= f0g. Hence q 2 R(e;pj)
which shows that q 2 [iR(e;pi). On the contrary, suppose now that q 2
[iR(e;pi). This means that there is at least one j such that q 2 R(e;pj).
Hence there exists f 2 M such that ¹(f;q;e;pj) 6= f0g. As a consequence
we have [i¹(f;q;e;pj) 6= f0g, and hence ¹(f;q;e;¦ipi) 6= f0g. This shows
that q 2 R(e;¦ipi).
7.3 Meet Properties and Join States
We can show that product contexts test meet properties while product states
are join states.
Proposition 14. Consider a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;»)
describing an entity S. Consider a set of properties (ai)i 2 L. Suppose that
we have experiments (ei)i available, such that experiment ej tests property
aj, and such that O(ej) \ O(ek) = ; for j 6= k, then the product experiment
¦iei tests the meet property ^iai.
Proof: Experiment ei tests property ai. This means there exists Ai ½ O(ei)
such that ai 2 »(p) , O(e;p) ½ Ai. Consider now the product experiment
¦iei. We will prove that ¦iei tests the property ^iai. Consider A = [iAi.
Then we have [iAi ½ [iO(ei) = O(¦iei). We have O(¦iei;p) = [iO(ei;p)
and, since O(ei) \ O(ej) = ; for i 6= j we also have O(ei;p) \ O(ej;p) = ;
for i 6= j. This means that [iO(ei;p) ½ [iAi , O(ej;p) ½ Aj 8j. Consider
the property a tested as follows by ¦iei: a 2 »(p) , O(¦iei;p) ½ A. Then
a 2 »(p) , aj 2 »(p) 8j, which proves that a = ^iai.
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Proposition 15. Consider a state context property system (§;M;L;¹;»)
describing an operational entity S. Suppose that we have a set of states
(pi)i 2 §, then the product state ¦ipi is a join state of the set of states (pi)i.
Proof: Suppose that we have ¦ipi 2 ·(a) for a 2 L. Since the entity is
operational we have an experiment e 2 M that tests the property a. This
means that there exists A ½ O(e) such that a 2 »(p) , O(e;p) ½ A.
From ¦ipi 2 ·(a) follows that a 2 »(¦ipi). Hence O(e;¦ipi) ½ A. As a
consequence we have [iO(e;pi) ½ A, which shows that O(e;pj) ½ A 8j, and
hence a 2 »(pj) 8j. From this follows that pj 2 ·(a) 8j. On the contrary,
suppose now that pj 2 ·(a) 8j, where e is again an experiment that tests
the property a 2 L. Then there exists A ½ O(e) such that O(e;pj) ½ A 8j.
As a consequence we have that [iO(e;pi) ½ A. Hence O(e;¦ipi) ½ A. From
this follows that ¦ipi 2 ·(a). This means that we have proven that ¦ipi is
a join state of the set of states (pi)i.
De¯nition 37 (Operational Completeness). Consider a state context
property system (§;M;L;¹;») describing an operational entity S. We will
say that the state context property system is operationally complete if for
any set (ei)i 2 M of contexts the product context ¦iei 2 M and for any set
of states (pi)i the product state ¦ipi 2 §.
Theorem 1. Any operationally complete state context property system
(§;M;L;¹;») satis¯es property completeness and state completeness.
Let us introduce the category with elements the operationally complete
state context property systems.
8 Conclusion
There remains a lot of work to make the formalism that we put forward into a
full grown theory. Potentially however such a theory will be able to describe
dynamical change as well as change by a measurement in a uni¯ed way. Both
are considered to be contextual change. Certainly for application in other
¯elds of reality this generality will be of value. As for applications to physics
it will be interesting to reconsider the quantum axiomatics and reformulate
the essential axioms within the formalism that is proposed here. This project
has been elaborated already within the earlier axiomatic approaches, which
means that part of the work is translation into the more general scheme that
we present here. However, because the basic concepts are di®erent it will
not just be a translation of earlier results. In the years to come we plan to
engage in this enterprise.
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